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D a n S p a r a c o
Speaking of the "emerging British underclass" in the late
1980s, Charles Murray declared that "Britain has a growing
population ofworkingaged, healthy people who live in a different
world from other Britons, who are raising their children to live in
it, and whose values are now contaminating the life of entire
neighborhoods."
In one sense, this statement embodies the exportation of
American-style discourse on poverty. But in another, this
statement is a rehearsal of underclass stereotypes that
industrialized societies have contained throughout their histories.2
These stereotypes claim to describe the "world" occupied by many
poor people through reference to a series of 'dysfunctions':
childbearing outside of the marriage relation, a resistance to or
ambivalence towards marriage as such, dependency on
government support, criminality, and a resistance to work, or, a
failure of the 'work ethic.'
Murray's work has been an aggressive and unapologetic
defense of 'basic American values' like marriage, hard work,
individualism, and the nuclear family; his ideological position has
been quite clear. That of the left, on the other hand, has lacked
a level of coherency which could lead to what could be called an
effective anti-poverty politics. I think this has been related to a
hesitancy about the lives many poor people lead; in other words,
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all too often, the above listed 'dysfunctions' were taken to be just
that by the left.' Is it these behaviors, or the material
circumstances in which they occur which merit our focus? My
sense is that the social practices like drug use or single parenthood,
for example, might not be (and indeed, often are not) seen as
social problems in a different, more affluent, context characterized
by good housing, education, and child care. Perhaps a resistance
by large sectors of the left to the possibility that an alternative set
of norms are being generated by communities of poor
people-where, for example, the institution of marriage does not
occupy a central place-has lead to a real lack of clarity about
where the energies of anti-poverty advocacy should be directed.
Our current situation makes it critical that we move beyond
this hesitancy. Between 1979 and 1992, the top fifth of the
population claimed 99% of the new wealth created in the United
States.4 If financial wealth were equal, each household would
possess $220,000. Butby 1991, median wealth was $36,000, and
the average wealth possessed by African American households was
$4,000.s 22% of children in the United States-15 million-are
classified as poor.6
Even in light of this gross inequality, poverty discourses have
rightly moved away from using the term 'underclass,' meant to
denote some distinct and separate 'culture of poverty'-the
"world" Murray refers to. But my resistance to this term is a bit
different, I think, then theorists who argue that it is inaccurate
because poor people really aren't as different or removed from the
mainstream as the term implies; like us, the argument goes, poor
people believe in the importance of 'values' like hard work and
family. While this may be true, I think it misses the core of the
underclass fallacy, which encourages the belief that poor people
are somehow fundamentally disconnected from the relations of
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production; that poor black single mothers, for example, are not
playing a productive economic. Such thinking dangerously
underestimates the importance of the labor of poor people in this
economy, which has an increasing need for low-skilled (and low-
waged) service workers.
But to make a different point, one thing I want to accomplish
here is to acknowledge the idea that, to the extent that the
concept'underclass' intends a statement about culture or 'values,'
it is not, strictly speakin& inaccurate: there are a multiplicity of
non-normative lives being lead by the poor (and non-poor), ones
which are, as Murray worries, different from or at odds with the
dominant culture. My task is to prepare the ground for thinking
about how an anti-poverty politics can begin with the conclusions
of folks like Murray. This is because I am concerned about what
interests are being spoken for by defenses of poor people based on
the logic that poor people are really, at bottom, 'just like us.'
One of the stated goals of welfare 'reform,' for example, was
the reinforcement or re-instantiation of the work ethic, of poor
peoples' 'attachment' to the world of wage labor. One response
to such a position can take the form of an argument which directly
opposes the story being told about poor people. One could
perhaps begin by pointing to the range of sociological research
which documents the devotion to 'the work ethic' exhibited by
poor people, across lines of race.' While I respect such
approaches when motivated by a genuine desire to defend poor
folks in places they can't often readily do it themselves--like in the
New York Times Op-Ed page, or on the floor of Congress--this
kind of defense leaves uncriticized, or implicitly vindicates,
normative values in ways I'm not comfortable with.
So here I would like to go further then this: further, that is,
then showing how poor people 'live up' to the ideals upheld by
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dominant American culture. I want to highlight and explore the
reality that many poor people (notto mention non-poor) don't live
up in this way. Resistances to wage labor and marriage are real;
there is no way around them, so instead we should map a path
through. I think such a path can valorize this resistance, and see
the ways in which it is productive and powerful. In this way,
rather then excusing or avoiding the reality of non-marriage or
non-work, those interested in an anti-poverty politics might best
think about the political potential of this reality. In it could lie a
truly progressive politics--one which doesn't fight for the right to
wage labor, but for a different relation between labor and income;
which doesn't apologize for the decline of the wedlockecl nuclear
family, but seeks new forms of human relations; which doesn't
apologize for single parenthood, but seeks new ways to raise
children, and considers this activity itself to be 'work.'
This inquiry is motivated by a belief that, at this moment, it is
critical to shed light upon the political possibilities latent within
(and realizable in) the lives of poor people. The representational
structures through which the struggle against poverty had
previously been fought are under threat, and while I make no
predictions about the future of these structures (for example,
unions or the nation-state), I want think about alternative modes
of and forums for political activity.
I think it is critical to acknowledge that the changes in welfare
have taken place in a time of increasing informatization of
production and increasing globalization of capital. Though
instigators of the changes in welfare were many and varied-some,
such as those on the far right, remain adamantly opposed to the
notion of a global economy undermining U.S. hegenony-it is
critical to consider the ways in which the move toward a global
economy discourages increases state-sponsored poor relief.'
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol5/iss1/6
67 Sparaco
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, coining the term
"informatization," argue in their work Empire that the nation-state
has less and less power to regulate the flows of money, technology,
people and goods across its borders. 9 Its decreasing ability to
impose its authority over the economy--especially the labor
market-should be read as a threat to the authority upon which
welfare programs are predicated, and to the forums through which
poor people have historically sought redress.
The processes of informatization and globalization, which I do
not pretend to summarize here, have wrought significant changes
in the nature of economic (and social) production. The computer
and informational revolution has brought about a situation where
"industrial production is no longer expanding is dominance over
other economic forms and social phenomena.""0 Evidence of this
can be found in the redefinition of manufacturing processes, and
in the migration from industry to service jobs. In manufacturin&
for example, "Toyotism" is replacing Fordism. "Ideally, according
to this model, production planningwill communicate with markets
constantly and immediately. Factories will maintain zero stock,
and commodities will be produced just in time according to the
present demand of existing markets.""
At a time when "information and communication have come
to play a foundational role in production processes,12 many
questions are worth raising concerning the impact of this new
situation upon the lives of poor people (none of which will I
pretend to give a complete answer to here). What new forms of
labor are coming about, for example, with the rise of "just in time"
production? What are the perils and possibilities of these new
forms of labor? How do these new forms undermine received
notions of work and productivity which are still prominent in
poverty discourses? Further, if informatization and globalization
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are beginning to fundamentally undermine traditional leftist anti-
poverty strategies, what new approaches are required?
Any new approach must grasp the evolving political and
economic terrain; my goal here is to suggest how normative claims
about work, productivity, and poverty both fail to take into
account the shifts of this terrain and atthe same time invalidate the
alternative forms of life being lived upon (and are helping produce)
this terrain.
According to Hardt and Negri, "the poor is a subjugated,
exploited figure, but nonetheless a figure of production." The
poor in this way are at the center of the political and economic
terrain-poor people make the economy work. "The poor itself
is power." i3 My concern here is the way that this power is blocked
or held 'hostage' by a set of normative values often invoked in
discussions of poverty, and often offered as the road to poor
people's salvation. I just don't think we can look to these values
for help here, nor do we need to: the necessary tools for fighting
poverty-which, really, is a fight for the creation of a new
society-reside precisely within the creative and prophetic power
of poor people themselves.14
Questioning the Need
for Work's Discipline
The U.S. has undergone a significant reorientation towards
service-based economy. In the "mass production system" which
characterized much of the previous century, 'plenty of blue-collar
jobs were available to workers with little formal education. Today,
most of the new jobs for workers with limited education and
experience are in the service sector .... ,,5 Between 1981 and
1991, 1.8 million manufacturing jobs disappeared."6 Low-wage
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service jobs have replaced them: between 1994 and 1997, there
were 19,000 new high-wage jobs, and 400,000 new jobs in retail
stores.17 Not only is service industry employment less stable and
less unionized then previous forms of blue collar work, there are
signs that there may not be enough of it. New York City, for
example, needs another 1 million jobs to employ all of its
unemployed and welfare-dependent"8
The effects this economic shift has had on the urban poor is
the focus of William Julius Wilson's When Work Disappears: The
World of the New Urban Poor. This text has had a significant
influence on the debate of the causes of poverty. At the risk of
oversimplifying his work, I want to focus on the link between wage
labor and what he terms "social organization"--the informal social
controls carried out by institutions and individuals within a
community-that plays a central role in his overall analysis. To be
clear, I am not coming at this as a sociologist-at issue here is not
the veracity of the studies Wilson uses but rather the assumptions
upon which his own analysis relies. My concern is that Wilson
relies upon a notion of work whose existence is being undermined
by economic shifts (shifts which he does acknowledges in part); as
well, this notion of work, as I will make clear, carries with it a lot
of baggage I'd rather do without.
The thrust of Wilson's analysis which I want to focus on here
is thatthe disappearance of work has been the major cause of the
problems found in "inner city ghetto neighborhoods."' 9  A
neighborhood in which people are poor but employed is
"different" from a neighborhood where people are poor and
jobless: fundamentally, that difference, as the title of his book
suggests, is the decrease in opportunities for wage labor in the
formal economy. Through this we can, Wilson asserts, understand
the reality of life in poor communities: "neighborhoods plagued by
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high levels of joblessness are more likely to experience low levels
of social organization: the two go hand in hand."20 More then any
other factor, joblessness explains the uniqueness, in terms of
severity, of inner city poverty. For example, Wilson point- outthat
ghetto neighborhoods were as highly segregated in the 1950s as
they are today. The fundamental difference between the two
periods is that in the fifties, more people in these neighborhoods
were working.
21
The explanatory power of work-not in some general sense,
but specifically wage labor-lies in the fact that, as Wilson sees it,
work is the critical "regular, and regulating, force" in the moral and
social life of a person and a community: it is "the central
experience of adult life." 22  In contemporary poor urban
communities, where wage labor previously served as the central
normative or normalizing force, its "disappearance," the decline,
that is, in the availability of formal sector employment, contributes
to the production of a new set of norms, a "dysfunctional" way of
life which Wilson captures with the term "ghetto related
behavior."
23
The difficulty I have with this analysis stems from the
assumption upon which it relies: the notion that wage labor must
be 'central' to adult life. The implicit referent of Wilson's analysis
is a 'stable,' working community with low levels of
'disorganization'-l first want to ask, where are, and who are,
these communities? I won't take up the task of speculating on this
question (because I'm not really sure where or who they are); but
I do want to point out the possibility that there are other
communities besides those of the inner city which lack the
regulating force of wage labor and manage to avoid being accused
of inordinate levels of social 'disorganization.' I would suggest that
wage work is not a central organizing force in, for example, the
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population of idle rich, or in allegedly 'normal' upper middle class
communities-many of which do not contain a single place of
employment within them, and within which there is a large
population of housewives whose 'only' concern is child rearing.
Universities as well contain thousands of people largely disengaged
from wage work. What I mean here is that we should note the
possibility that there exists a dearth of wage work in many
communities, not just those in inner cities. Within many of these
other communities, whatever social disorder exists-relating to
crime, drugs, sexual behavior, or dependency-is an amount of
disorder which is largely tolerated or excused by society at large.24
Thatwork is a "regulating" force I do not deny (in fact, I would
say that is precisely the problem). Nor do I question that wage
labor has been "disappearing" from inner cities. As Wilson
documents, from 1967 to 1987, northern cities hemorrhaged
manufacturing jobs, the kind of low-skilled, unionized jobs many
relied upon to raise a family: Philadelphia lost 64%, Chicago lost
60%, New York lost 58%, and Detroit lost 51%."3 Through the
1980s, New York City lost 135,000 jobs where workers had an
average of less then 12 years of education, and gained 300,000
jobs in areas where workers averaged 13 or more years of
education.26
It just seems to me that this is a moment where we can (and
must) consider alternate forms of life's 'regulation' which do not
rely upon the centrality of wage labor in the fashion Wilson does.
Wilson's analysis leaves us in a place where the only solution is to
engineer the return of the kind of jobs which have fled cities. I
think instead that the decline of stable low-wage labor begs us to
re-examen wholesale the claim thatwage work (an eight-hour shift
in a factory, for example) is central to a community's 'social
organization."
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The broad cultural acceptance of this notion does not negate
it's boldness, anthropologically and philosophically speaking. I'm
trying to highlight that the hegemony of particular notions about
work fundamentally-and unnecessarily-limits our ability to
conceive of alternative forms of economic and social Existence.
This is an urgent problem at a moment when these notions are at
risk of serious destabilization as a result of shifts in economic
production. I also think Wilson's reliance on the centrality of wage
labor weds us to relations of power which we might be better off
critiquing.27
The limitations I'm talking about are, for example, the kind
Wilson places on what counts as legitimate work, on what counts
as 'being productive.' His analysis exempts a host of productive
activities from the definition of work: housework and baby sitting,
and drug dealing are not part of the realm of legitimate forms of
work because they do not possess the traits of formal sector work:
"greater regularity and consistency in schedules and hours."28 For
the wage laborer, "the demands for discipline are greater."
I'm just not so sure about this; in fact, I'm inclined to read our
society's failure to consider mothering, for example, as worthy of
a 'wage' as saying much about the relations of power among the
sexes. Mothering might lack the discipline of wage labor, but it is
subject to the needs of a child which might provide an
alternative-more autonomous, but not lesser-mode of
'regulation' of life. As well, not only do each possess their own
particular 'discipline,' but housework, baby sitting and drug
dealing, while all quite different forms of work, are united in their
inability to be directly disciplined by corporate capital. That is,
they are not forms of labor directly subject to the demands of this
power; I see this as an intrinsic value to these forms of labor.
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Ironically, corporate capital is in a position where it is essential
to be "mobile" and "flexible." 9  That is, production and
management practices increasingly favor flexibility. As a result, it
may be problematic to rely upon 'consistent' or 'regular' forms of
labor ata momentwhen production often favors, and capital flows
often produce, irregularity. The informatization of production
"now facilitate[s] the effectively instantaneous mobilization and
mobility of capital.""0 The shift in the nature of production directly
effects the nature of employment. underemployed and
contingent/part-time/ temporary workers make up perhaps as
much as one quarter of the work-force."' This trend in
employment-masked or minimized by official unemployment
statistics-significantly undermines the static notion of workwhich
Wilson sees as central to a healthy, 'socially organized'
community.
32
Both because false limitations on the definition of 'legitimate
work' inscribe particular dominations-economic, gendered, and
racial-and because shifts in production are beginning to surpass
previous models of labor, we need to seriously reconsider the kind
of work which Wilson wishes there was more of. All of this is
meantto question the notion of 'social organization' with which he
seems to work. That is, his call for a remedy for severe inner city
poverty seems to serve also as an endorsement of a particular set
of norms which make claims about what family, work, and
recreation are supposed to look like. The alleged universality and
timelessness of these values, I argue, pose a significant limitation
on our ability to conceive of new forms of life (as such values are
meant to do). I am interested in conceiving the forms of life which
exist in poor communities as politically potent evidence of
creative, autonomous powers which the 'discipline' of the wage
relation has the effect of holding back. Thus, I seek to view these
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forms of life with more then just a disapproving eye. A first step in
this direction is de-linking that which the notion "low social
organization" invites us to conflate: on the one hand, particular
cultural practices, such as non-marital relations among the sexes,
and on the other, the poverty and material deprivation in which
such 'non-normative' practices take place.
Such a de-linking is meant to make the point that 'fighting
poverty' is different then fighting the decline of a set of traditional,
normative ideals regarding work and family structure. A failure to
appreciate this difference risks re-enacting relations of power
which contributed to the problems of inner city communities to
begin with; this, I am suggesting, is what Wilson risks doing by
linking his critique of the economic plight of poor people in the
inner city with a critique of non-normative "ghetto related"
behaviors. These are actually two very different projects; I
subscribe to the first, but the it seems to me that second is carried
out in service of a particular set of normative values which I'm
really not interested in for the reasons I've highlighted.
What if 'non-normativity' was embraced, rather then simply
brought back into the narrative of the 'American mainstream,' or
scolded by it?33 The purpose of such a reconsideration is to see
how non-normative practices of poor urban communities contain
the kernel of new forms of life, of a transformative, even
revolutionary praxis. I disagree with critiques of such practices
which fail to take this possibility into account-even if they seek to
end poverty or economic inequality-because such critiques throw
out the baby with the bath water.34
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The Hegemonic Power of Work
in the Lives of Poor People
No Shame in My Game, Katherine Newman's study of the
working poor in Harlem, New York, and Kathryn Edin and Laura
Lein's study of the lives of welfare mothers, Making Ends Meet, are
examples of work which is helpful in understanding the ways in
which work does play a role in the lives of poor people. Newman,
for example, finds that "69% of the families living in central
Harlem have at least one worker.""5 In their study, done before
welfare reform in 1996, Edin and Lein find that-in part because
cash welfare, food stamps, and SSI covered only three-fifths of a
welfare-reliant mother's expenses2 -- 5% of the welfare-recipient
mothers worked jobs and reported them, 36% worked off the
books or under a different name, and 8% worked in an illegal
underground economy."
Inthisway, Newman and Edin and Lein demonstrate the ways
in which poor people are connected to 'the world of work.' But
if one only celebrates this fact-this dedication to and desire for
work-one risks missing the detrimental effects of the hegemonic
power of work as it functions in the lives of poor people. I am
concerned here with the ways this power decreases people's
ability to conceive of a political and social life in which something
other then low-wage service work dominates.
I will be careful here, because I recognize that a devotion to
work, a commitment to working, is often the only way out of
poverty: I think we can, however, recognize this, and at the same
time push further, and move towards a broader critique of a
society which claims that work is the "central experience of adult
life" and at the same time glosses the form work actually takes in
the lives of poor people: often a demeaning and futureless
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'McJob'-the kind of job which leaves people feeling as though
they were economically and politically powerless. Because of this,
I want to ask: in what ways does an ideological devotion to
work-of both poor people and society as a whole-legitimize
demeaning, dead-end labor, as well as poverty as such, and
obfuscate the need for transformative political activity?
To put this another way, I want to ask a different question
then Newman does when she asks, "where does this drive come
from, this desire to be a working person?"38 Instead, I would like
to ask: what are the effects of this desire?
There is no doubt that basic material needs-for food and
housing, among other things-along with the inadequacy of social
welfare programs, makes the need for employment necessary and
real, even predictable. At the same time that I recognize the
reality of deprivation, I also want to be careful not to allow this
reality to place limitations upon other inquiries like, how could the
desire to be a 'working person' be redirected and become a desire
for a life liberated from low paying, dead-end wage labc.r?
I ask this question because I don't necessarily think that all
poor people already possess this kind of liberatory desire; I want
to resist the idea that poor people, by virtue of their poverty,
somehow 'naturally' come to this. There are, of course, very real
desires for liberation from poverty; but I want to think about the
ways this can be realized not by becoming a low-wage laborer but
through an opposition to menial low-wage labor.
I recognize that many poor people might not be interested in
making the critique I want to here, because becoming a 'working
person' is for some a way out of poverty. But I think I can begin
to get at this problem by separating, on the one hand, the material
needs satisfied through acquiring an income, and on the other
hand, the non-material or perhaps moral satisfactions which come
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with becoming a 'working person,' and living up to the
requirements of those in the 'mainstream.' Again, I realize the
necessity of fulfilling material needs for food, shelter, and
education, but we need to look closer at this 'moral' satisfaction;
that is, the often deeply satisfying moral and ideological
investments which develop regarding work, when one lives up to
normative claims made about working. While such investments
are seemingly benign or beneficial in the lives of middle class
people, they may have the effect of binding poor people to a set
of values which, I argue, end up legitimizing poverty. The
transformative potential which resides in the lives of poor
people-evidence of which I begin to see in the cultural practices
often labeled 'dysfunctional'--can only be released by poor
people themselves. I am concerned with the ways that the
ideology of work, or the morality of which work and the 'work
ethic' are a central part, demands that poor people forsake this
transformative potential-for the sake of becoming 'normal,
working people.'
As I move in this direction, I want to respect Edin and Lein's
finding that welfare-recipient mothers had a unanimous desire to
end all government support. 39 I am not unaware of the cultural
significance of the difference between getting a welfare check from
the government and getting one from an employer. But both of
these are, strictly speaking, forms of income which can fulfill
material needs. Despite this, I would suggest that today many
(though not all) of these mothers would still want to end
government support and find employment, even if welfare-based
incomewas equal to an adequate employment-based income and
even if they weren't forced to participate in workfare. In other
words, some of the mothers would choose work even if there
income from a job was no higher then their welfare benefits. This
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idea is meantto point outthe way in which work possesses a value
in addition to and independent of income.4°
My concern is the ideological function of this additional value,
and the ways in which work is seen as an avenue by which one
can become valuable. For example, Newman argues that the
desire to work manifest in the lives of Harlem's poor is evidence
that the "messages of the mainstream world get through.""' While
I think this is the case, I read these messages (differently then
Newman, perhaps) as exalting the value of work and working
people, while denying value to welfare recipients-those who are
given income but don't work. The desire to work which Newman
observes is, I think, the search for this value which supposedly
comes through work, however demeaning this work may be.
In other words, I wantto suggest the possibility thatwhat Edin
and Lein's welfare mothers might be seeking if they chose
employment-based income over welfare-based income is
somethin& some value, which the regime of normative values
denies they possess or holds 'hostage,' a value that this regime
needs them, for the sake of its own legitimacy, to try and 'get
back.' I do see the advantages, both psychic and material, to
becoming a person who is validated by these normative values.
But there are so many who are left 'unvalidated' that: serious
reconsideration is required of both the moral and spiritual value of
work (and the corresponding de-valuation of those associated with
poverty and non-work) and the existing regime of normative values
of which work in this sense is a central par This reconsideration
begins by affirming that whatever value is bound up in the notion
of being a 'working person'-'moral,' political, or economic-it is
one which welfare recipients already possess.
Newman, taking a much different approach, suggests that
"work benefits inner city workers because working keeps them on
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the right side of American culture." On this account, there is, the
one hand, a group of working people who have "made the right
choice;" on the other, a group who has failed to "separate
themselves from the irregular, the excluded, the despised, and
cleave to the regular, the accepted ..... 42
I think this is a really problematic way of looking at things.
What, I wonder, does it mean for an author writing about poverty
in Harlem to discover 18% unemployment 3 and a 14:1 ratio of
applicants to jobs in fast food establishments-a 'boom industry'
in the area, and a major source of employment"-and at the same
time frame her discussion of poor lives in a way that 'individual
choice' plays a prominent role? Newman's investment in a
particular ideological position, one which embraces work (and the
desire for it) as morally fortifying, seems to result in a real
ambivalence aboutthe peoplewho are formally unemployed, who
are "excluded" or "despised." Perhaps this is just the result of a
perspective which is thankful that anyone escapes the clutches of
inner city poverty and unemployment, and which views the
situation as so dire thatwe need to accept the fact that there aren't
enough life preservers to go around. I don't really know; but I do
know that there are a whole lot of people on that 'wrong side.'
This talk of sides might encourage the idea that the 'wrong side,'
this underside, is full of people outside of or removed from social
and economic production. As I have tried to suggest, it is incorrect
to think that poor people, by virtue of poverty or lack of
employment within the formal sector, occupy a position of
economic irrelevance or powerlessness within society.
This division between the right and wrong sides of American
culture is put to use by some of the workers Newman encounters
in a way which encourages them to buy into the notion that they
have become 'productive' members of society while the
"excluded" and "despised" remain outside of (or beneath) such
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productivity. Amidstthe assault upon their character which is part
of the daily experience of a fast food restaurant employee, workers
and managers, according to Newman, "call upon timeless
American values to undergird their respectability."4" "...I know
people who are on [welfare] that can get up and work," says one
worker. "There's nothing wrong with them. And they just chose
not to...."
46
I recognize the need of these workers to defend themselves
from the demeaning nature of fast-food service work; but it seems
to me that Newman's investigation into the daily lives of poor
people working 'McJobs' was an opportunity to suggest a
framework whereby the workers could understand their situation
without the need to refer to a kind of class antagonism which I
think comes along with 'timeless' American values. While I am
trying to keep in mind the difficulty these workers face, I want to
suggest that poverty might not exempt poor people from the need
to reflect upon the alleged 'timelessness' of the values Newman is
talkingabout, even if they might help make low wage employment
tolerable. These values, at least when put to use in this fashion,
denigrate and isolate the non-working poor in a way that both
undermines the sophisticated critiques that poor people make of
poverty47 and masks the way in which, particular circumstances
aside, poor people in Harlem are united in being poor.
It is also noteworthy that the worker's terms are quite similar
to middle class critiques of the "welfare-dependent." I think
recourse to this way of thinking re-inscribes particular cultural
values within Harlem's poor community of color which have
traditionally been used by working and middle class whites to
isolate and denigrate that same community. While perhaps not
intending to, Newman's text has the effect of demonstrating this
way of thinking:
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Drug dealers, welfare recipients, the hustlers, the jailed and
forgotten-these are the people whom the working poor see
as occupying the lower rungs of ghetto social organization.
Working men and women, no matter how lowly their jobs,
can hold their heads up in this company and know that
American culture "validates" their claim to social rank above
them.'
What desires are satisfied when one, for example, 'hold one's
head up' over a welfare recipient? What does it mean for this to
be a satisfying experience? Can this desire effect a 'solution' to
poverty, or does it simply maintain or legitimize it? When poor
people are doing the head-holding, how does it obscure the
material circumstances shared by all poor people regardless of
which 'side' their on, and thus undermine counter-hegemonic
political activity organized around that unity? The struggle against
poverty will have to contend with precisely these desires, and with
the way they lead to the use of a particular morality as a weapon
against others who don't fit its requirements.
The Search for Possibilities
in the Age of Information
I have tried here to investigate some normative categories used
in debates and discussions about poverty, to begin to think about
their continued use in, and what effect they have upon, what
could be called an anti-poverty politics. My discussion of William
Julius Wilson's When Work Disappears was meant first to highlight
the disconnect between the notion of work or labor which informs
his analysis and the reality of labor atthe dawn on the 21-1 century,
and second, to scrutinze the urge to call lives lived within this
disconnect 'dysfunctional.' I am trying to suggest the possibility
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that the cultural practices labeled dysfunctional are in fact
adaptions to a political and economic situation that can no longer
be described in the terms Wilson would like to use-at least with
respect to work. In other words, what may need 'reform' is not
the lives and behavior of poor people, but the ways in which their
political and economic circumstances are understood. I have used
Wilson's notion of work to suggest that rather then seeking to
enforce a particular understand of work that both the economy
and poor people might be leaving behind, perhaps we should
reformulate the notions of work and productivity used to talk about
poverty and economic justice. By doing this, I have tried to
suggest, the cultural practices of inner city poor people can be
'reread' by poverty discourses as containing positive,
transformative potential.
My analysis of Katherine Newman's No Shame in My Game
was intended to grasp, within the lives of poor people, the effects
of the ideology of work, and particularly the moral dimension of
work, upon which Newman, Wilson, and welfare reform itself
relies, though in differentways. I have consistently recognized the
fact that a dedication to the redeeming value of work is a tool that
can be used by poor people to escape poverty and, as Newman's
study shows, to justify and make tolerable otherwise intolerable,
dead-end, low-wage labor. But we cannot be blind to the effects
of such a dedication. Each effort meantto justify or make tolerable
the conditions of low wage service work might displace efforts
which could be dedicated to makingwar againstthis work, and its
dominance in the lives of poor people. I think a position needs to
be found that both recognizes the material needs which are
satisfied by 'McJobs'-and thus the need for this type of
employment-and atthe very least recognizes the limited form of
salvation this type of labor offers.
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I have also tried to show how the moral dimension of work
can lead working poor people to create a division between
themselves and the non-working, when perhaps a unity based
upon their shared poverty would be more productive; this
morality's emphasis on individual volition encourages the belief
that objective success or failure is really a matter of 'choice.' This
morality bound up in the 'plus value' of work, the value
independent of income which I have discussed-what Newman
might call the moral fortification which comes with becoming a
'working person'-needs to be openly questioned where it
functions to convince people that it is only by becoming a 'working
person' that one actually becomes a valued member of society. In
this way, the moral dimension of work obscures the actual value
of poor people to economic and social production.
In other words, similar to Hardt and Negri's conception of
critique from the standpoint of the exploited, I do not imagine
myself in any way as "aligned with the marginalized or the
powerless." While I may conceive of poor people as exploited, I
recognize that they are "always already central to the dynamic of
social production; [they are] always already in a position of
power."49 Perhaps a passage from Newman, writing about a
family she encountered in Harlem, can help us picture this:
If we were to look at an official government census of Rey's
household, we would find that the adults within it are
classified as out of the labor force. Indeed, it would be
deemed a single-parent household supported by the welfare
system. Harlem is populated by thousands of families whose
official profiles look just like this. Yet there is a steady stream
coming into Rey's home, because most of the adults are
indeed working, often in the mostly unregulated economy of
small-scale services and self-employment, including home-
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based seamstresses, food vendors, gypsy cab drivers, and
carpenters. Most of this income never sees the tax man.sO
The power Hardt and Negri are talking about isn't completely
illustrated here, but I do think the example of Rey's household is
helpful in grasping the productivity of poor people. I also think it
is critical to see how the autonomous, 'informal' entrepreneurship
of self-employed seamstresses and carpenters is fundamentally
different from a 'McJob.'
But I am concerned with the ways that the moral dimension
of work tries to obscure or hold hostage the power to which Hardt
and Negri refer, which might create an unwarranted feeling of lack
in the lives of poor people. Do Black people in Philadelphia, for
example, conceive of themselves, by virtue of their numbers and,
more importantly, their central role in that city's economy, as in a
position of political and economic power? Much of my work here
has assumed that not enough do, and that only a reversal of this
can create a new society and release work's hostages. Perhaps the
deconstruction of the moral 'plus value' of work is a way through
which poor people can recognize the value, the power, they
already possess.
What has driven this inquiry is a belief that the economic and
political terrain is changing drastically. Changes in economic and
political structures require that poor people prepare to confront
poverty notthrough representatives in labor unions or Congress but
directly, themselves, (with the help of those very things, such as the
internet, which have accelerated these changes). My analysis is an
attempt to prepare for a situation where such structures, while
previously representing the needs of poor people and mediating
their desires, do not or can no longer carry out this function.
Debatingwhether this is actually the situation we are in-whether
structures like the state or labor unions really can't function as they
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have in the past-will be left for another day. My point here
rather has been to discuss the problem of poverty while
recognizing the changes that are, indisputably, taking place now,
without predicting the future, and begin thinking about how
debates about poverty can take these changes into account.
Thinking about poverty requires thinking about forces and
processes-in particular, informatization and
gobalization 1 -which might undermine any recourse to structures
such as the state to rectify the injustice of the 1996 changes in
welfare. The International Monetary Fund, for example, is
explicitly encouraging the world--'developed' and 'developing'
both-to move towards a neo-liberal model of capitalism.52
According to the IMF, labor-market 'flexibility,' central to the neo-
liberal model, consists of
less generous unemployment insurance provision in terms of
benefit payments, duration of benefits, and qualifications of
benefits; wider earnings dispersions; lower levels of
unionization and less centralized wage bargaining; less
government intervention in the wage-bargaining process;
fewer restrictions on hiring and firing of employees; and lower
social insurance charges and other non-wage labor costs, such
as the amount of paid vacation.5 3
What are the effects of such a model upon both poor people and
upon the structures with the help of which poor people have
historically sought protection-from wide "earnings dispersions"
and unrestricted "hiring and firing"?
Ajobs Study conducted bythe Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) suggests that "a reduction of
unemployment benefits and the restructuring of social assistance
are seen as important in removing disincentives to job searches
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and acceptance of low wage work."5 4 The U.S. market itself is
celebrated for it's labor market's "flexibility,""' no doubt in part
because the 1996 changes in welfare basically apply a logic similar
to the OECD's Jobs Study. Specifically, welfare in this country at
this moment is designed notto protectworkers from discontinuities
in the labor market but to force them to live with those
discontinuities-whether it is in the form of low wages, temporary
work, or no health benefits.56
I do want to point out that welfare reform may be difficult to
read simply as the subjection of the American poor the demands
of global economic elites, or that globalization 'caused' the
changes in welfare. I say this because welfare reform, as its very
substance suggests, was uniquely American in theme and
character, and was in some sense not a preparation for economic
changes, but a wish that these changes hadn't happened. For
example, I think it could be argued that workfare programs have
in mind a romanticized notion of both wage labor and its
availability which is no longer applicable in an age of
informatization and globalization. It is almost as if workfare
embodies a hopeful wish for a return to some romanticized time
prior to the global economy and shifts in economic production;
perhaps it is a demand that the poor re-make this previous,
imagined, 'simpler' world where anyone willingto work could find
a blue-collar, non-temporary job with decent pay and benefits,
without the need for a government 'hand-out.' 7 In this sense,
workfare might be the calculated resistance of a conservative
culture unwilling to deal with economic change and the resulting
displacement and isolation of large numbers of people. All of this
is a way of saying that it is most likely incorrect to view welfare
reform as 'in the service of' globalized capital, or informational ized
production and might instead be a reaction or resistance to it.
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It is critical, however, to consider the ways in which the
current climate, characterized by the power of the IMF and by
shifts in economic production, makes it difficult to imagine going
back to a situation of welfare, health care, and unemployment
benefits at levels that shield the poor from, rather then subject
them to, economic hardship. One way to grasp this difficulty is to
acknowledge how the reference point for much of the American
left's own politics-Western European social democracy-has
been more directly subject to the forces and processes of
informatization and globalization. Ramesh Mishra points out that
the new function of European social democracy has shifted away
from sponsoring progressive state-based policies towards the more
modest aim of assuring that the retrenchment of capital is a more
equitable process then it has been in the U.S.' Mishra takes this
as evidence of a significant narrowing of political choices in Europe
effected by the power of informationalized and globalized
capital. s9
Whether this is a temporary situation or not, it is one that
cannot simply be ignored or written off as anomalous by anti-
poverty advocates in the U.S. To the extent that a new
arrangement of power is emerging, we should be prepared to
leave behind traditional economic and moral conceptions of work
and construct new concepts which correspond to this emerging
arrangement. While I recognize the violence new forms of
economic and political power wield over poor people, I see this
shift away from traditional arrangements as a positive one, since
they were themselves extemely problematic; their surpassing will
require that anti-poverty advocates, and poor people themselves,
formulate new notions of work and productivity which leave
behind the limitations of the old. In this sense, the emerging
economic order is better in the same way that Marx insists that
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capitalism is better then the forms of society and modes of
production that came before it.
Notes
1. Chris Jones and Tony Novak, Poverty, Welfare, and the Disciplinary State
3(1999).
2. Id at4.
3. For more on the left's ambivalence towards poor people, mothers on
welfare in particular, see Francis Fox Piven, The Link Between Welfare
Reform and the Labor Market 4 HYBRID 1 (2000).
4. Jones and Novak, supra note 1 at 19.
5. Id.
6. Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The Working Pcor in the
Inner City xii (1999).
7. Jones and Novak, supra note 1 at 28.
8. See Ramesh Mishra, Globalization and the Welfare State (1999).
9. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire xi (2000).
10. Id at 285.
11. Id at 290.
12. Id at 289.
13. Id at157.
14. Paraphrasing Empire at 65. The direct quote states: "whereas
Machiavelli proposes that the project of constructing a new society from
below requires "arms" and "money" and insists that we must look for them
outside, Spinoza responds: Don't we already possess them? Don't the
necessary weapons reside precisely within the creative and prophetic
powers of the multitude?"
15. William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New
Urban Poor 27 (1996)
16. Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work 8 (1995)
17. Newman, supra note 6 at xii.
18. Id at 269.
19. Wilson, supra note 15 atxix.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol5/iss1/6
89 Sparaco
20. Id at21.
21. Id at 54.
22. Id at 52.
23. Id at 51-52, 71-73.
24. Alternatively, we might consider what inner city communities would
look like if, while still lacking the presence of wage work, and still containing
their allegedly 'dysfunctional' cultural practices, they had good schools,
benefitted from a generous social safety net, child care, had an intact
physical infrastructure and decent housing, and didn't suffer from racism.
How might this scenario map the situation of middle and upper class white
communities: which do enjoy government largess; where there is often a
disengagement from wage work; where there is drug abuse; where there are
single-parent families; where there is deviant sexual behavior?
25. Wilson, supra note 15 at 29.
26. Id at 32
27. "....in a disciplinary society, the entire society, Ath all its productive
and reproductive articulations, is subsumed under the command of capital
and state, and... the society tends, gradually but with unstoppably
continuity, to be ruled solely by criteria of capitalist production. A
disciplinary society is thus a factory-society." Hardt and Negri, supra note 9
at 234.
28. Wilson, supra note 15 at 74.
29. Hardt and Negri, supra note 9 at 152.
30. David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions
Regarding Welfare Workforce 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1997).
31. Id.
32. "Although government employment data indicates that official
unemployment in the United States is less than five percent, everyone
recognizes that many of the details-and human beings-are lost in the
governments peculiar non- counting. For example, when one counts the
underemployed, temporary, and contingent part-time workers who no,
constitute conservatively multi-millions of workers, and those the
government no longer counts, such as workers who have vanished from the
official unemployment figures because they have exhausted their
unemployment compensation insurance benefits after twenty-six weeks, the
"official" unemployment level may be only one-third of actual
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Vol. 5 2000 HYBRID 90
unemployment." Id.
33. I recognize the possibility that Wilson has made no error in his
argument-he may, in fact, be uninterested in the way in which they might
embody alternative forms of life, or their oppositional nature, because his
position is not, fundamentally, oppositional.
34. Again, perhaps that is precisely the point-the baby, of course, being
the cultural practices, behaviors, and beliefs which some consider
'dysfunctional.' I would like to spend more time 'cleaning up' or discarding
the bath water; that is, the broader cultural and economic milieu iI which
these practices take place, one in which things as single parenthood are
penalized, politically, culturally, and economically-with evident racial bias.
35. Newman, supra note 6 at xi.
36. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet 43 (1997).
37. Id at 45.
38. Newman, supra note 6 at 209.
39. Edin and Lein, supra note 39 at 64.
40. For an analysis of the relationship between work and income, see
Michael Hardt, Guaranteed Income, or, the Separation of Labor and
Income, 4 HYBRID 21 (2000).
41. Newman, supra note 6 at 215.
42. Edin and Lein, supra note 39 at 111.
43. Newman, supra note 6 at 57.
44. Id at 62-63.
45. Id at 98.
46. Id.
47. For such a critique, see Kensington Welfare Rights Union,
Criminalization of the Poor 4 HYBRID 50 (2000).
48. Newman, supra note 6 at 113.
49. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysis: A Critique of the
State Form 307 (1994).
50. Newman, supra note 6 at 201.
51. "Globalization" has most broadly been defined as "the intensilication of
economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders." See
Clarence Lusane, Persisting Disparities: Globalization and the Economic
Status of African Americans, 42 How. L.J. 431, 432 (1999). Lusane argues
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol5/iss1/6
91 Sparaco
that it is impossible and perhaps even dangerous to comtemplate the blad:
condition without a framework that critically links the local with the glob3l.
52. See generally Mishra, supra note 12.
53. Id at 9, citing IMF World Economic Outlook (1994).
54. Id at 10, citing The OECD Jobs Study: Implementing the Strategy (1995).
55. Id at 9.
56. See Lusane, supra note 57 at 433: under these new circumstances of
globalization, "labor's ability to bargain in its own interests, i.e., [for]
increased wages, better benefits, greater safety guidelines, stronger pension
and retirement plans, and job protection, is severely undermined."
57. See note 32 for a discussion of official unemployment statistics, which
incorrectly paint the picture that just about everyone is already working, and
thus risk leading people to think that there really is a job waiting for
everyone willing to work.
58. Mishra, supra note 12 at 54-55.
59. The recent history of Sweden is instructive on this score. In the 80;,
when capital controls were removed in that country, there was a virtual
hemorrhage of capital out of the economy towards more 'investor-friendly'
dimes. Greater economic openness has since spelled the end of full
employment. In the late 80s, unemployment was still about 2,%, and in
1990, it was 1.8%. But by 1993, it was 9.5%. (Unemployment continued to
hover near 1 % through the 90s). As Sweden becomes more integrated into
the global economy, though Swedish labor continues to rely upon Swedish
capital, the latter has wider options. This has translated that into a strong
domestic position for capital, politically. In 1994 for example, when the
Social Democrats were poised to win a national election, four of S-eden's
largest international companies publicly threatened that 50 billion Skr.
would be at risk if taxes were raised. Id at 76.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
